As Nigeria undertakes this historic reform of its policing architecture, we must resist the temptation to focus only on decentralising power. Equally important is democratising accountability. A decentralised police system without democratic oversight merely relocates power; it does not necessarily make policing better. But a decentralised police service anchored on broad-based democratic accountability has the potential to transform policing into what it ought to be, a truly public institution that exists to serve, protect, and earn the trust of the Nigerian people.
Some of us have consistently argued that many of the pressing challenges confronting Nigeria are rooted in the country’s governance structures. If we are serious about solving these challenges, then we must be equally serious about structural reforms. That is why I am excited by some of the far-reaching reforms the present administration is pursuing, particularly the decentralisation of the Nigeria Police as a response to the country’s worsening security situation.
The debate over state police is not new. It has remained a recurring subject in Nigeria’s security discourse for more than four decades. Before the military coup of 1966, Nigeria operated a decentralised policing system comprising the national police, regional police, and native authority police. Following the coup, however, the military abolished these structures and centralised policing under what became the Nigeria Police Force.
With Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 and the renewed calls for true federalism, the conversation around decentralising the police resurfaced. Over the years, the demand for state police has only grown stronger, driven largely by the country’s deteriorating security landscape and the limitations of a highly centralised policing system.
One of the strongest arguments for state police is the inability of the current Nigeria Police Force to effectively secure a country as vast and diverse as Nigeria. With a landmass of over 900,000 square kilometres and a population exceeding 200 million people, the country is simply too large for a centrally controlled police institution with inadequate personnel and resources. The consequence is the emergence of vast ungoverned spaces that criminal elements have exploited with increasing sophistication.
Equally problematic is the concentration of command and decision-making at the centre. Although the police maintain commands across the federation, many critical operational decisions still require approval from Abuja. Such excessive centralisation often delays responses and weakens the effectiveness of policing at the state and community levels.
Opposition to state police has largely been driven by concerns that governors may abuse the institution for political purposes, much like some regional governments were reported to have done before the 1966 military coup. While these concerns deserve attention, I do not believe they are sufficient grounds for maintaining the current centralised arrangement.
The truth is that no governance system is entirely abuse-proof. Even under the present structure, the police have at different times been used by powerful political actors, wealthy individuals, and influential interests to intimidate opponents and advance private agendas. The issue, therefore, is not whether abuse is possible, it always is. The real question is whether we can design institutions with robust safeguards that make abuse more difficult, while ensuring that they remain accountable to the people they exist to serve.
Public institutions exist to serve the people. To ensure they do so faithfully, democracies establish accountability systems that subject those institutions to public oversight, rather than leaving them accountable only to political office holders. Under the proposed reforms, the Nigeria Police Council will be replaced by a National Police Council, with oversight responsibilities extending to both federal and state policing structures. However, the composition of this body deserves careful examination.
After decades of debate, Nigeria now appears to have reached a historic turning point. The momentum has shifted decisively in favour of decentralised policing, and the government has initiated the constitutional amendment process required to establish a new federal and state policing architecture. If successfully implemented, Nigeria will finally have a policing system that aligns more closely with its federal structure and is better positioned to respond to the unique security realities of each state.
One reform I particularly welcome is the proposal to change the nomenclature from the Nigeria Police Force to the Nigeria Police Service. While this may appear symbolic; symbols matter. The word “force” reflects the institution’s colonial and military heritage, whereas service speaks to its democratic responsibility to protect, assist, and serve the people. A name change alone will not transform the institution, but it is an important first step in reshaping its culture and identity.
Having crossed the first hurdle by embracing decentralised policing, we must now focus on the second and perhaps more important challenge: designing an operational framework that guarantees effectiveness, professionalism, and accountability for both the Federal Police Service and the State Police Service.
This is why the ongoing constitutional amendment process deserves close public scrutiny. Beyond creating new policing structures, we must carefully examine the institutional arrangements being proposed, especially the mechanisms for democratic accountability. Weak accountability has been one of the defining weaknesses of many public institutions in Nigeria, and the police have not been an exception.
Public institutions exist to serve the people. To ensure they do so faithfully, democracies establish accountability systems that subject those institutions to public oversight, rather than leaving them accountable only to political office holders. Under the proposed reforms, the Nigeria Police Council will be replaced by a National Police Council, with oversight responsibilities extending to both federal and state policing structures. However, the composition of this body deserves careful examination.
The existing Nigeria Police Council comprises the president, state governors, the chairman of the Police Service Commission, and the Inspector-General of Police. While these are important stakeholders, this arrangement cannot reasonably be described as a democratic accountability mechanism. It is essentially an internal governmental oversight structure with little or no direct representation of the broader society.
The version of the constitutional amendment bill earlier passed by the House of Representatives proposed a far more democratic model. It provided for the inclusion of representatives from the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), traditional rulers, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), and two representatives of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). This is much closer to what democratic oversight should look like, because it broadens accountability beyond government and creates space for the organised civil society to participate in police governance.
…I believe the National Assembly should retain the broader and more representative framework originally proposed by the House of Representatives for both the National Police Council and the State Police Service Commission. Including organised civil society in the accountability structure of the new police service is not merely desirable, it is necessary. It will strengthen public confidence in the institution, improve transparency, encourage better decision-making, and ensure that policing remains genuinely people-centred.
Unfortunately, the Executive Bill subsequently transmitted by the president has weakened this framework. It removes the representatives of the NUJ and traditional rulers from the proposed National Police Council and reduces the representation of the National Human Rights Commission from two members to one. Even more concerning is the proposal regarding the State Police Service Commission. Rather than constitutionally defining its composition, the Executive Bill leaves this critical issue to be determined by an Act of the National Assembly. I struggle to see the wisdom in postponing such a fundamental governance issue. If democratic accountability is essential at the federal level, it is equally indispensable at the state level.
For this reason, I believe the National Assembly should retain the broader and more representative framework originally proposed by the House of Representatives for both the National Police Council and the State Police Service Commission. Including organised civil society in the accountability structure of the new police service is not merely desirable, it is necessary. It will strengthen public confidence in the institution, improve transparency, encourage better decision-making, and ensure that policing remains genuinely people-centred. Public institutions must be designed to serve citizens, not merely the political elites. They can only fulfil this mandate when they are themselves accountable to the people.
I would also make a strong case for the inclusion of youth representatives on both the National Police Council and the State Police Service Commission. There are compelling reasons for this. First, young people constitute the largest demographic segment of Nigeria’s population. Any accountability structure that excludes them cannot genuinely claim to be representative.
Second, young Nigerians interact with the police more frequently than perhaps any other demographic. They are therefore uniquely positioned to contribute valuable perspectives on police conduct, public trust, and community engagement. Their inclusion would foster constructive dialogue between the police and the country’s largest population group, while improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of the new policing system.
Ultimately, democratic accountability should not be limited to the new Federal and State Police Service. It should become a defining principle for the governance of all public institutions in Nigeria. Our public institutions must reflect the diversity of the people they serve, especially those demographic groups that are often overlooked despite bearing the greatest impact of institutional failures. Accountability structures should intentionally create space for citizens, organised civil society, professional bodies, youth, labour, traditional institutions, and other critical stakeholders to participate in governance.
When public institutions are structured to be accountable to the people, they become more responsive, more transparent, and ultimately more effective. More importantly, they begin to rebuild the public trust that is indispensable to democratic governance.
As Nigeria undertakes this historic reform of its policing architecture, we must resist the temptation to focus only on decentralising power. Equally important is democratising accountability. A decentralised police system without democratic oversight merely relocates power; it does not necessarily make policing better. But a decentralised police service anchored on broad-based democratic accountability has the potential to transform policing into what it ought to be, a truly public institution that exists to serve, protect, and earn the trust of the Nigerian people.
Olumide Fred’ Adetiba is a transformation architect whose work sits at the intersection of faith, leadership, governance, and development. He serves as the Executive Director of Madiba Foundation for Good Governance and the Lead Steward of The Finishing Church, where he is committed to raising model citizens and advancing societal transformation.
